INTRODUCTION

I have been asked to view the problems that make up the study of psychology from a biological vantage. What characterizes the differences between a biological psychologist, psychobiologist, psychophysicologist, and physiological psychologist on the one hand and an ordinary psychologist on the other? What characterizes the differences between a biological psychiatrist on the one hand and a psychoanalyst and a transactional analyst on the other.

It has long been my contention that biology and physiology ought to be part and parcel of every approach to the issues in psychology and psychiatry. By this I do not mean that everyone must practice the biological approach nor even be interested in the special problems that the biological and physiological approach entails. What I do mean is that there is a range of problems within every major approach to psychological issues that cannot be fruitfully tackled without reference to the biological level of analysis. Often, recourse to this level is critical to understanding; Merton Gill’s and my reassessment of Freud’s “Project” (1976) and Edmund Wilson’s volume on Sociobiology (1975) are two recent examples.

If indeed biology and physiology are part and parcel of every approach to psychological issues, what are these approaches and how does physiology fit within them? I will begin with an analysis of behaviorism because of its pervasive impact on psychology and the fact that many biologists feel they are practicing psychology when they use the behavior of organisms as their dependent variables. Further, my references to biology will be restricted to brain physiology because that is my field of competence. It should be relatively easy to extrapolate these views to the endocrine system and
BEHAVIORISM AND PSYCHOLOGY

The behaviorist revolution is completed. Its success is heralded in the numerous texts that proclaim psychology to be the study of behavior. We need now only to get on with our experiments, for all is well in our world. Or is it? Do the series of theoretical statements ranging from Watson's, *Psychology from the Standpoint of a Behaviorist*, through Gilbert Ryle's *The Concept of Mind* to Skinner's most recent *About Behaviorism* really accomplish a science of psychology? Do the observations and experiments undertaken under the banner of behaviorism really address the problems and issues raised by philosophical inquiry? And further, do these observations and experiments really encompass all of the problems and issues that concern psychologists?

The time appears right to ask these questions because the behaviorist revolution is indeed completed and its successes and failures can be reasonably assessed. Behaviorism as a vital scientific discipline continues to grow both in maturity and in new applications outside psychology.

Perhaps in this statement can be found the key to assessment. When a biologist observes behavior in an assay of a biochemical constituent of the brain, does he automatically become a practicing psychologist? When a computer scientist attempts to simulate his thought processes on an information processing program is he addressing a problem that does not concern psychologists because he is not observing or controlling behavior? And what about the experimentalist who measures the electrical conduction of the skin, the heart rate, the movement of eyes, or the electrical responses of the brain in a problem solving situation? Is he measuring “behavior” and if he is or isn't does that matter with regard to whether he is pursuing psychology?

As an answer to these questions, another may be posed. Has it perhaps been a mistake to identify behaviorism with psychology? Behaviorism is a discipline; the study of behavior has its set of problems such as the definition of what constitutes behavior. As a discipline it has already made fantastic contributions to technology and the understanding of the behavior of animals and of men and women. And there is no reason why scientific psychology should not be based on such an understanding of behavior.

But there are limits to understanding achieved solely through the observation and experimental analysis of behavior. These limits are especially apparent when problems other than overt behavior are addressed, problems related to thought or to decisional processes, to appetitive and other motivational mechanisms, to emotions and feelings and even to imaging and...
perception. These problems make up a large bulk of the interests that bring students to the study of psychology, and at least one behaviorist (Skinner, 1976) has grouped them under the rubric “covert behavior.” Being “covert” they need to be enacted to be studied (Miller et al., 1960). Enactment in overt behavior is, however, only one avenue of study; others such as computer stimulation or the recording and analysis of brain electrical activity may prove just as effective in achieving scientific understanding—perhaps even more so when used in combination with behavioral enactment.

In a very real sense, therefore, psychology as a science reaches out beyond behaviorism to these covert processes. Ordinarily, these covert processes have been labeled “mental” and there is no good reason to abandon this label. Our perceptions such as vision and hearing are mental processes. Our feelings of emotion and motivation are mental, our intentions and decisions are mental and, as we shall see, even our actions are mental.

Psychology as the study of mental life, as William James and George Miller have called it, is biologically rooted; one aspect of life is studied. As such it aspires to be a conventional science. The problem lies in providing a useful definition of what is mental. Could not such a definition be derived from an analysis of behavior (and if so perhaps a more concrete terminology substituted). But as already noted, problems of definition also plague behaviorism.

SOME CONFUSIONS

Psychology as a behavioral science and as the science of mental life needs therefore to have clearly defined what is meant by behavior and what is meant by mental. Here, the approach will be taken that confusion has plagued psychology because both the term behavior and the term mental have remained ambiguous. Each term has in fact been used in two very distinctly separate ways and the distinctions have not been clearly kept apart.

When a behaviorist ordinarily analyzes “behavior” he is studying a record of responses emitted by an organism in a specified situation. The record can be studied in any location, it could have been produced in any of a number of ways by any number of different “response systems,” e.g., arms, legs, beaks, etc. The behavior under study is an environmental consequence of any of these response systems (Pribram, 1971).

At other times, however, “behavior” is understood to mean the pattern of the organism’s movements or of his endocrine or neural responses in a situation. This definition of behavior is especially common to biological behaviorists such as ethologists, but it is also invoked by psychologists (even staunch behaviorists) when they begin to address the problems of covert behavior.
What then is the concern of a science of behavior? Are its laws to be
formulated on the basis of descriptions of the behaviors of organisms or the
behaviors of organ (response) systems? Classically, the laws describing the
behavior of organ systems has been the province of physiology. There are
physiologists (and physiological psychologists) who believe that a lawful
description of brain processes should be coordinate with the laws derived
from observations of behavior. These physiologists may well be correct but
due to the brain is contained within the organism such identifications fall
easy prey to the category errors warned against by Kant, by Russell and
Whitehead, and by all subsequent critical philosophers. In a strict sense a
brain cell does not “see” its “visual” receptive field, the cell responds to
excitation of its dendritic (receptive) field which results from luminance
changes that have been transduced into neuroelectric potentials by retinal
receptors. Perhaps the behaviorist will be content when the laws of behavior
and those describing brain function coalesce—but that has not been the
tenor of those who espouse the establishment of a science of behavior,
separate from physiology.

The mentalists have not fared much better than the behaviorists in stating
clearly what psychology, the study of mental life, is to be about. Are mental
processes to be identified on the basis of verbal reports of introspection and
therefore, the contents of introspection? Are mental processes the resultants
of an organism’s being-and-acting-in-the-world as Whitehead, Husserl, the
phenomenologists, Gestalt psychologists, and existentialists would have it?
Or are the contents of introspection nothing more than these resultants of
being-(or acting)-in-the-world? If they are, what then is the difference
between what a behaviorist calls covert behavior and the existentialist calls
mental? Logically there is none.

SOME DIFFERENCES

Though logic can find little to distinguish an existential psychologist from
a sophisticated behaviorist, historically the gap is great between how each
goes about constructing his science. The behaviorist, as already noted, is
devoted to objectively observable discrete behavioral responses—he makes
inferences, yes, but these inferences must be operationally and explicitly tied
to the environmental manipulations that produce these discrete observable
behaviors of organisms.

By contrast, phenomenologists, Gestalt psychologists, psychoanalysts,
and existentialists analyze subjective experience. Contrary to opinions
expressed by some behaviorists, these investigators do not eschew observa-
tion. Nor do their concepts, when derived scientifically, lack in operational
rigor. As with behaviorists, the operations to which these concepts are tied,
are operations performed on the environment, not on the organism. Thus, they share the interests of psychophysicists. As psychologists, they use these operations to attain concepts about subjective experience (as reported verbally or inferred from nonverbal communication) instead of using them to attain laws describing behavior.

It is this remoteness of the measurable dependent variable from what is being studied that makes the mentalists' job more difficult than that of the behaviorist. But inference from observable events to nonobservable ones is commonplace in the natural sciences. Quantum and nuclear physicists have built precise models of the micro-universe from observing the effects of events on measurable variables rather than by observing the events themselves. Physiological chemists often postulate the presence of a biologically active substance from the effect it has, many years before that substance is identified chemically. In like manner, a mentalist may investigate hunger, visual illusions, states of consciousness with the aim of modelling these experiences via their observed effects on reports of their occurrence or of finding a neuroelectric response to be coordinate with the experience.

Thus, a science of mental life is as likely to become rigorous and respectable as a science of behavior. This does not mean that the models of psychological experience and the laws of behavior will prove to be similar any more than the models of quantum physics resemble the laws of mechanics. Psychology therefore can readily encompass both levels of inquiry—and perhaps other levels such as explorations of social communication, as well. Biology as well as physics has its molecular and molar divisions. Why not psychology?

Stated in this fashion behaviorism becomes essentially a reductive endeavor. True, current behaviorists do not view themselves as reductionists. Skinner and others have repeatedly claimed that they are descriptive functionalists. But description entails the possibility (though not the necessity) of reduction (Pribram, 1965). By contrast, a phenomenal or existential approach eschews this possibility.

Phenomenal-existential mentalism is rooted in being-in-the-world. Basically, therefore, there is an upward—or perhaps better stated as an outward—reach, if experience is considered the starting point of inquiry. Experience is of a piece with that which is experienced. Issues of self, of intention and intentionality are derivative and always include a being-in-the-world approach to solution. Phenomenal and existential approaches thus share with social psychology the derivation of self or person from the being-in-the-social world.

Psychoanalysis stands midway between the behaviorist and the phenomeno-existential methods. Freud's clinical theory is obviously intentional and rooted in being-in-the-world. Thus, the clinical theory ought to be akin to phenomenal-existential psychology. By contrast, the metapsychol-
ogy deals with biological (and sometimes social) mechanisms, is therefore reductive in its search for causality and in spirit. What has happened in latter-day psychoanalysis is a confounding between this spirit that motivates the metapsychology and the frame and setting of the clinical theory. The result is a melange that makes little scientific sense even to theoreticians within psychoanalysis: thus, the current vigorous attempts at separating the clinical theory from the metapsychology, the development of the new action psychology, etc. These attempts should lead to clarification if the distinctions made in this report are kept in mind.

CAUSES AND REASONS (STRUCTURE)

There is another important and related distinction that separates behaviorism from a phenomenal-existential approach to psychological issues. The experimental analysis of behavior searches for causes in a tried and true scientific fashion. Skinner is interested in the environmental contingencies that cause reinforcement to occur. Other behaviorists are utilizing such reinforcing stimuli to cause a modification in behavior.

The existential-phenomenal approach is entirely different. It is concerned with the structure of experience-in-the-world (Merleau-Ponty, 1963). It is perhaps significant that when George Miller, Eugene Galanter and I enlarged our compass and became subjective behaviorists we titled a book Plans and the Structure of Behavior (Miller et al., 1960) while Merleau-Ponty (1963), attempting a precise formulation of existentialism, authored The Structure of Behavior. An analysis of structure does not involve a search for causes. Structure is multiply determined and has many reasons for being.

Existential-phenomenal psychology has not up to now been very clear in its methods. I suggest that multidimensional analyses (factor analysis, principle components analysis, step-wise discrimination analysis) might serve well as tools to investigate the structure of experience-in-the-world. Linguists have also provided models of analysis: after all, structuralism derives from the social and linguistic analyses of de Saussure (1922).

Another conceptual tool that could prove useful to existential-phenomenal psychology comes from physics. In looking upward in a hierarchy of systems, Einstein found relativity. The larger view showed that the local calculations were dependent on context. Is not this the everyday experience of the phenomenologist? The contextual dependency of experience is what makes its structure so rich, but this very richness makes its structural relationships so difficult to specify. Relativity (whether the special or the general theory) is difficult enough to grasp for physical systems. How much more difficult will it be for the psychological?
THE NEUROBIOLOGIC PARADIGM

HOLOGRAMS AND TRANSFORMATION

Recent discoveries in the brain sciences augur yet another approach to psychology that is utterly different from the behavioristic and phenomenal-existential. This approach has more in common with that of the mystics, e.g., the depth psychology of Carl Jung (1960) and the more recent transpersonal conceptualizations (see, e.g., Tart, 1977). It is also kin to the views expressed by philosophers such as Leibnitz in the Monadology and by Whitehead (1958). Many modern physicists have espoused similar concepts to explain observations made at the quantum and nuclear levels of inquiry. David Bohm (1971, 1973) and Wigner (1969) to name two of the foremost.

Holography was initially seen as a powerful metaphor to explain the distributed nature of memory traces in the brain (Pribram, 1966). Clinical or experimental lesions of neural tissue do not remove specific memories. Lashley (1960) in his paper on the search for the engram despaired of comprehending the biological basis of memory organization because of this resilience of learned behavior to brain damage. But the hologram has just these properties: the holographic film can be injured or cut up into small pieces and an image can still be reconstructed from any of the pieces; thus the name hologram—every part contains sufficient information to characterize the whole.

Holograms are blurred records of images and objects. Each point of light is spread over the entire film as is every adjacent point. However, the blur is an orderly one and the set of mathematical expressions that define the blur (such as the Fourier transform) are often called spread functions. A good way to conceptualize the nature of the spread is to visualize the concentric circles of ripples made by a pebble thrown onto the smooth surface of a pond. Throw in two pebbles and the spreading concentric circles will cross each other and create interference patterns. Throw in a handful of pebbles and when the interference patterns are at their maximum, take a photograph of the surface of the pond: the photograph is a hologram.

Because the spread of ripples (waves) can be precisely specified, it is possible to recreate the location of impact of each pebble by performing the inverse of the mathematical operation (the spread function) that described the creation of interference patterns. The procedure is similar to that performed by NASA when an orbiting camera is taking a photograph of the surface of Venus or Mars. The photograph is a blur but because the speed of the camera relative to the planet is known, that "speed" can be subtracted out and a clear image obtained.

Holograms, thus, provide a ready instrument for spreading (distributing) information which can easily be retrieved by performing the inverse of the transform by which the hologram is constructed. In fact, when Fourier transforms are used, the same mathematical equation describes the initial
transform and its inverse. Thus, by repeating the same procedure an image of an object is obtained.

Why bother with these transformations? What are the attributes of holograms that make them so useful? There are many, but the most important for understanding brain function are: (1) the readiness with which images can be reconstructed from a distributed store; (2) the resistance of a distributed store to injury; (3) a fantastic advantage in computing power: practically instantaneous cross and autocorrelations are possible (this is why in X-ray tomography calculations are made in the Fourier domain); (4) a tremendous increase in storage capacity—recently a billion bits of retrievable information has been stored in a cubic centimeter of holographic memory; (5) the fact that images constructed from one part of the hologram are recognizably similar to those constructed from another (translational invariance); and (6) the facility for associating two "images" in the holographic store and retrieving both in the absence of one, i.e., when only one of the previously associated images is present, illumination of it and the hologram will reconstruct the other, as is the case in associative recall.

This is an impressive list of attributes, which can go a long way in explaining hitherto persistent puzzles of brain functioning in memory and perception. But is there any evidence that the brain actually encodes sensory input in a holographic fashion? Over the past decade such evidence has been coming out of the researches of many laboratories and I have reviewed it elsewhere (Pribram et al., 1974). Essential is the fact that the mathematical descriptions of sensory processes fit those that describe holography (e.g., Bekesy, 1967; Ratliff, 1961, 1965) and that the cells of the sensory channel and brain cortex have actually been shown to encode in the holographic domain (Campbell and Robson, 1968; Robson, 1975; Pollen and Taylor, 1974; Glezzer et al., 1973; Schiller et al., 1976; Movshon et al., 1978a,b,c; Pribram et al., 1978; De Valois et al., 1978a,b). The evidence is impressive and the experimental results obtained by De Valois and his students have specifically tested alternative interpretations and have left little doubt as to the validity of the earlier results.

A hologram, as noted above, encodes "ripples" made by a disturbance (a pebble, a sensory input). Ripples are vibrations (waves) and the evidence is that individual cells in the brain cortex encode the frequency of waves within a certain band width. Just as the strings of a musical instrument resonate to a specific range of frequency so do the cells of the brain cortex. Many hitherto ununderstandable sensory and motor functions can best be explained in terms such as frequency analytic mechanisms—sensitivity to the spectrum of vibrations and fluctuations of energy in the physical environment and within the organism itself (Pribram, 1971).

It is here that contact with physics is made. David Bohm (1971, 1973) has pointed out that the discrepancies in conceptualization that lead to the
Conceptual or theoretical behaviorism is "reductive" as I have noted in that it concerns the causes of behavior of organisms and organisms are made up of organs whose functions may be the cause of some particular behavior being displayed. True, classical behaviorists have sometimes concentrated on the environmental contingencies that cause behavior but they have always acknowledged the organism even when treated as "empty" and often have ascribed drives, genetic variation and the like to such organisms. Nor do they deny that the brain is a potent source of stability in behavior and that the modification of behavior entails the modification of brain function.

The phenomenal-existential approach to psychology brings with it a somewhat more interesting set of questions about the relationship between biology and psychology. If, as I have claimed, the phenomenal-existential approach must become structural if it is to be scientific, then the question arises as to what is the place of biology in that structure. My own answer to this question has been to focus on the problem of representation (Pribram, 1978). Evidence shows that our experience becomes represented in the brain and that in turn we represent our experience in language and other cultural endeavors. In short, there appears to be a commonality—a commonality which we recognize as complimentary representations—among biological and social structures.

The holistic approach to the issues of psychology is at the same time so old and so new that it is difficult at this time to assign any special role to biology. The mystical tradition effaces the organism-environment dichotomy. Still, it is through the biological data on brain organization and function that I arrived at a holistic view. Here, perhaps even more than in the two other approaches to psychology, the study of biology and brain physiology becomes inseparable from that of physics and social interaction. Here we stand at the edge of comprehension awaiting new data and new insights.

REFERENCES


